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True Fiction: Competing Theories of
International Legal Legitimacy and a
Court's Battle with Ratione Temporis
Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to
the political power of another, without his own consent. The only
way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and
puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men
to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe,
and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment
of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not
of it.1
I. INTRODUCTION
When is the right thing to do not really the right thing to do?
In international law, there are two approaches to determine when
international institutions behave legitimately. One theory holds
that international institutions' actions are legitimate when they
2
promote human rights. The other theory holds that international
institutions behave legitimately only when their actions are based
on the consent of states.3 The consent-based system, theoretically,
only observes human rights that states consensually recognize and
protect.4 This consent-based international system is similar to the
social contract theory of political philosopher John Locke.5 Treaty
1. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 95 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).
2. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-60, 289-327 (Oxford University
Press 2004).
3. Id.
4. FERNANDO TESON, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 41-42 (1998).
5. See generally LOCKE, supra note 1.
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law is built upon this premise, that consent is necessary for a party
to be bound to a treaty.
This Note addresses one human rights treaty, the American
Convention on Human Rights ("American Convention" or
"Convention"). This treaty conveys power on the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights ("the Court") to hear claims brought by
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("the
Commission"). One such claim was presented in the Case of
Moiwana Village v. Suriname.7 Despite limits, the Court issued a
judgment involving a matter to which Suriname did not
consensually grant jurisdiction.8 Instead, the Court created a legal
fiction that enabled it to judge Suriname for actions it took prior to
becoming a State Party to the American Convention. While this
action is illegitimate under a consent-based theory of legitimacy, it
is consistent with a theory principled on moral legitimacy.
Part II of this Note will provide background information on
the case at hand. Part III will establish the preliminary objections
made by Suriname to the case and set forward the responses
offered by the Commission and the Court. Part IV argues both
that the Court created this legal fiction and that the Court's
remedies are extra-jurisdictional in scope. Part V will conclude by
offering warnings about over-stepping the consensual bounds of
human rights treaties too far in the hopes of creating a new type of
international legitimacy. In cases of alleged human rights
violations by states that occurred prior to that state's assent to the
treaty at issue, international courts should strike a careful balance
between consent-based and human rights-based theories of
international legitimacy.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1980, Desire Bouterse overthrew Suriname's democratic
government, establishing a military government in its place.9 The
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 9, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331,
8 I.L.M. 679.
7. Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
at 10 (June 15, 2005). Suriname is a small country in South America, situated north of
Brazil, between Guyana and French Guiana, with a population of approximately 440,000
people. See generally CountryReport.org, Suriname Country Information,
http://www.countryreports.org/country.aspx?countryid=229&countryName=Suriname
(last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
8. Id. at 9-11.
9. Id. at 31.
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opposition Jungle Commandos responded violently to the new
military government, fighting the military in East Suriname. ° The
military regime countered with increasing violence." One such
violent response occurred on November 29, 1986, when a group of
Suriname troops raided Moiwana Village while searching for a
rebel leader.1 2 During the raid, army forces killed thirty-nine
villagers and burned many village buildings, while many other• 13
villagers fled. The villagers that fled have since refused to returnS 14
home and bury their dead.
After the massacre, a civil government was re-established in
Suriname from 1987 to 1990."5 Despite the re-introduction of a civil
government, investigations into the massacre were slow to startS 16
and unproductive. In May of 1989, government troops forcibly
released a lead suspect who was arrested after admitting that he
had been trained by the government." Desire Bouterse admitted
ordering the attacks but refused to cooperate with civilian
investigators. In 1990, the lead investigator was murdered, a
crime which has not been investigated. In 1993, many victims'
bodies were found in a mass grave. Despite a parliamentary order
for the executive to investigate the massacre, no investigation has
21
occurred. Instead, the executive passed "Amnesty Act 1989" to
pardon those who committed crimes against humanity between
1985 and 1992.22
These events culminated in Moiwana '86, a victims' rights
non-governmental organization ("NGO"), requesting the
Commission to inquire into Suriname's conduct concerning the
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Amnesty Int'l, Suriname: Government Commitments and Human Rights, AI
Index AMR 48/001/2003, Feb. 7, 2003, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR480012003.
13. Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
at 32 (June 15, 2005).
14. Id. at 36-37.
15. Id. at 31.
16. Id. at 37-39; Suriname: Government Commitments and Human Rights, supra note
12, at 4.
17. Moiwana Village, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, at 37-38.
18. Id. at 38.
19. Id.
20. Suriname: Government Commitments and Human Rights, supra note 12.
21. Id.
22. Moiwana Village, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, at 41.
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massacre and subsequent investigations.2 ' The Commission later
petitioned the Court on December 20,2002.24
III. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
Moiwana Village v. Suriname follows from the Commission's
application to the Court made on December 20, 2002.25 Suriname
made a preliminary objection arguing that the Court lacked26
jurisdiction ratione temporis. An international human rights court
has "jurisdiction ratione temporis if the alleged violation takes
place during a time when the court has jurisdiction over the
State. 2 1 Suriname became a Party to the American Convention on
28
November 12, 1987. Since time constrains jurisdiction, the date of
Suriname's membership is important for determining what events
the Court has jurisdiction to review.29 "A State Party can only be
held responsible for violations of the Convention that took place
subsequent to the date of entry into force of the American
Convention with respect to the State in question."30 This principle
of non-retroactivity is rooted in Article 28 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that a treaty's
provisions are not binding on a party for acts that occurred prior to
that party becoming a member of the treaty.3
Despite this temporal limitation on the Court's jurisdiction,
"the Court may have jurisdiction over the effects of events that
took place before the State accepted the Court's jurisdiction but
continued or had effects," otherwise known as continuing
violations. While there is dispute over what constitutes a
continuing violation, 33 a simple definition is "the breach of an
23. Suriname: Government Commitments and Human Rights, supra note 12
(petitioning the Commission June 27, 1997).
24. Moiwana Village, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, at 2.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id. at 7-11.
27. JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 107 (2003).
28. Moiwana Village, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, at 2.
29. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT,
1920-1996: VOLUME II -JURISDICTION 579-80 (3d ed. 1997).
30. Jo M. Pasqualucci, Preliminary Objections Before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights: Legitimate Issues and Illegitimate Tactics, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 40 (1999).
31. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, art. 28.
32. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 27, at 110.
33. Compare Alan Nissel, Continuing Crimes in the Rome Statute, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
653 (2004) (discussing the different crimes that may constitute a continuing violation), with
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international obligation by an act of a subject of international law
extending in time and causing a duration or continuance in time of
that breach."" The clearest case of a continuing violation is forced
disappearances."
In its preliminary objection, Suriname contended that the
Commission applied the Convention to it ex post facto for acts that
36occurred prior to becoming a Member State to the Convention.
Suriname argued that the complaint should be dismissed because
there were no allegations that Suriname violated the Convention
after becoming a party, and that the Court's only recognized
continuing violation is forced disappearances.37
The Commission and the representatives of the victims
responded by urging that their claims are principled on a
continuing denial of justice."' These parties continued that the
claims are for events that occurred after Suriname became a State
Party, or are of a continuing nature.39 The representatives
contended they only look to the facts of the massacre itself for a
reference point in identifying Suriname's subsequent obligations.4 °
The Court found that it has jurisdiction to examine the effects
of acts occurring prior to Suriname becoming a State Party, as well
as violations occurring after Suriname became a State Party.41
First, the Court has jurisdiction to hear the violations occurring
subsequent to Suriname becoming a State Party.42 This includes
the delay in beginning an investigation, the forceful release of
suspects, the murder of the lead investigator, and the amnesty law
promulgated by the Suriname government.43 Second, the Court
also has jurisdiction to hear two continuing violations, and to hear
claims related to these actions. The first alleged continuing
Joost Pauwelyn, The Concept of a 'Continuing Violation' of an International Obligation:
Selected Problems, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 415 (1995) (proposing a methodology for
analyzing whether a violation is continuing).
34. Pauwelyn, supra note 33, at 415 (emphasis omitted).
35. PASQUALUCCI,supra note 27, at 112.
36. Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
at 7 (June 15, 2005).
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id. at 8-9.
40. Id. at 9.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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violation is a denial of justice.44 The second continuing violation
involves the effects of villagers remaining off their ancestral lands,
which were allegedly caused by a forced displacement.45
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The Court's Analysis of Continuing and Subsequent Violations
Is Rooted in a Legal Fiction
The Court's analysis involves an inherent condemnation of
Suriname for its role in the massacre. The Court considered fourS46
different violations of the Convention. The first allegation is that
Suriname violated Article 5 of the American Convention in
conjunction with Article 1(1). 4' Article 1(1) is the "basis for State
responsibility in the Inter-American system."48 Article 1(1)
requires states "to respect the rights and freedoms recognized [by
the Convention] and to ensure to all persons subject to their
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms,• . . ,49
without discrimination." Article 5, concerning the right to
humane treatment, requires the respect for all people and their
dignity. ° The representatives argued Suriname violated this article
due to, inter alia, its responsibility for and impunity to the
massacre.51 Holding Suriname responsible for its role in the
massacre is outside the jurisdictional purview of the Court because
it would judge Suriname for the act itself, which occurred prior to
Suriname accepting the Court's jurisdiction.
While the Court found Suriname in violation of Article 5, its
reasoning was somewhat disguised.52 The Court first reasoned that
because Suriname has not given the villagers justice, it was
prolonging their suffering over the tragedy and fear of future
attacks.53 Next, the Court urged that the villagers' beliefs preclude
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 42, 46, 52, 55.
47. Id. at 42.
48. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 27, at 220.
49. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
50. Id.
51. Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
at 42 (June 15, 2005).
52. Id. at 43-46.
53. Id. at 44-45.
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them from honoring the dead until "they know what happened to
the remains of their loved ones." 54 Finally, the Court blamed
Suriname for the villagers having abandoned their lands."
On its face, this analysis seems not to lay blame on Suriname
for the initial bad act, but rather for its effects. However, Suriname
is not actively keeping the villagers off their land. The villagers'
refusal to return is based on their own cultural beliefs.56 Second,
the villagers' apprehension over Suriname's future conduct, while
justified, may not be eliminated even in the event of a public
apology coerced out of Suriname by the Court. Additionally, case
law does not support the assertion that a state's inability to
reconcile with a culture's belief system is either a wrongful act or a
continuing violation.
A wrongful act derived from Article 5 would seem to indicate
maltreatment, not a lack of activity (i.e., not investigating the
massacre). Additionally, this is not a continuing violation, since
continuing violations are normally reserved for forced
disappearances.57 In the Blake Case, the Court held that the
continuing violation from a disappearance ends when "the victim's
fate or whereabouts are established."" Yet in the Cantos Case, the
Court apparently limited ongoing violations to situations like the
Blake Case." If there was no continuing violation for confiscating
property in the Cantos Case, then it is not facially apparent how
Suriname is guilty of a continuing violation based on the villagers'
choice to remain away from their land.
The facts here are distinct from the continuing crime of a
forced disappearance. It is said that "[t]he paradigmatic continuing
crime is [the] enforced disappearance of persons ....,,60 These
crimes begin with a person that has vanished, much like a
kidnapping, but continue as a government denies its
54. Id. at 45.
55. Id. at 46.
56. Id. at 22, 24, 25 (summarizing statements made by former Moiwana Village
residents).
57. PASQUALUCCI,SUpra note 27, at 112.
58. Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
at 10 (June 15, 2005) (citing Blake Case, 1996 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 27, at 8-9
(July 2, 1996) (preliminary objections)).
59. Cantos v. Argentina Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 85, at 10-11 (Sept.
7, 2001) (preliminary objections) (holding a property confiscation was not a continuing
violation).
60. Nissel, supra note 33, at 668.
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responsibility.6 Further, a dichotomy exists between extrajudicial
killings and disappearances, based on knowledge of the victim's
death.62 Amnesty International cites discovery of the victim's body
as a way to make certain the death occurred for the purpose of• 63
ending a disappearance. Here, the numerous witnesses' accounts• . . 64
guarantee that the victims died and make this crime seem more
similar to an extrajudicial killing than to a disappearance.
Additionally, Amnesty International distinguishes 'political
killings' from 'disappearances'. 65 The reason for this rhetorical
difference is the emotional effect forced disappearances have on
6the victim's family. Even though extrajudicial executions are
morally abhorrent, the uncertainty , associated with a
67disappearance continues to harm the families indefinitely, thus
creating the prototypical continuing violation.
There are several possible explanations for why the Court
considered the failure of justice and inability of villagers to return
to Moiwana to be a continuing violation. One explanation is that
the Court was influenced by the briefs of the Commission and
amici curiae arguing for a remedy based on Suriname's
involvement in the massacre itself. Knowing it could not justify a
finding that Suriname had violated the Convention on this
reasoning, the Court instead created a legal fiction to support its
desired outcome.
Another explanation is that the Court expanded the
definition of a continuing violation to address governmental•. 68
impunity for past violations and to prevent future atrocities. In
Velasquez v. Guatemala, the Court "expanded the scope of
reparations for cases of forced disappearances in the inter-
American system" by ordering Guatemala to exhume and return• ., . 69 ..
the body to the victim's family. This specific remedy is not stated
61. AMNESTY INT'L USA, 'DISAPPEARANCES': A WORKBOOK 84 (1981).
62. Id. at 86.
63. Id.
64. Moiwana Village, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, at 20, 22-24.
65. Amnesty Int'l, Conspiracy of Terror: Political Killings and 'Disappearances' in the
1990s, at 4, Al Index ACT 33/35/93, Oct. 1, 1993.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 171
(1999).
69. Megan Hagler & Francisco Rivera, Bamaca Velasquez v. Guatemala: An
Expansion of the Inter-American System's Jurisprudence on Reparations, 9 NO. 3 HUM.
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in either the Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons0 or the Declaration on the Protection of
all Persons from Enforced Disappearance.71  The Bcmaca
Veldsquez Case shows the Court's tendency to expand continuing
violations. This tendency, coupled with a proclivity to reward. ,,72
"innovative theories and claims concerning reparations and the
Suriname villagers' continuing fears to return to the village based
on their own cultural beliefs, together explain why the Court is
likely to have expanded the definition of a continuing violation to
include the present case. Thus, the legal fiction is that the Court is
ordering remedies for a continuing violation while choosing not to
indict Suriname for its actions in conducting the massacre.
The second alleged violation is of Article 22 of theS 74
Convention, relating to freedom of movement and residence.
Article 22 prohibits a state from denying people the opportunity to
freely traverse within the state. The Commission and the
representatives tried to equate the villagers choosing to leaveS 76
undesirable conditions with a forced eviction. Even Suriname 's
rhetoric that the villagers fled indicates the situation was
undesirable.77 Accordingly, the Court notes that "until the
Moiwana community members obtain justice for the events of
1986, they are convinced that they cannot return to their ancestral
territory" because of their spiritual beliefs.78
It is uncontestable that the villagers' culture keeps them away
from Moiwana. However, their fears are rooted in the actions that
took place prior to Suriname becoming a Member State. The
Court quoted the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal
RTS. BRIEF 2,2 (2002); Case of Bimaca Velisquez v. Guatemala, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 91 (Feb. 22,2002).
70. Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, adopted
June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1529.
71. Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A.
Res. 47/133, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992). Note that the violation is
continuing as long as the fate and whereabouts are concealed (Art. 17) and that
compensation is available as the remedy for victim's families (Art. 19).
72. SHELTON, supra note 68, at 174.
73. Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
at 22-27 (June 15, 2005).
74. Id. at 46-51.
75. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 49, art. 22(1).
76. Moiwana Village, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, at 46-47.
77. Id. at 47.
78. Id. at 49.
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Displacement, 28(1), in that "[c]ompetent authorities have the
primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as
provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to
return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes.")M
The legal fiction here is that when the Court writes that
Suriname has not made conditions satisfactory for the villagers'
return, it implies the conditions are bad. The conditions are bad
because of the massacre, which created a condition unacceptable
to the international community. Furthermore, this recognition of
unacceptable conditions inherently condemns Suriname for
maintaining the conditions it created. This inherent condemnation
is a judgment against Suriname for its actions prior to becoming a
Member State.
The third alleged violation is of Article 21 of the Convention
concerning the right to property.80 Article 21(1) guarantees
everyone "the right to the use and enjoyment of his property.,
81
The representatives argued that Suriname violated this right by
characterizing the events as a "forcible expulsion., 82 They further
argued that this deprivation continued due to Suriname's failure to83
investigate the massacre. The Court does not analyze the
villagers' departure as a forcible expulsion, instead focusing on84
Suriname's failure to investigate the massacre. The analysis on
Article 22 applies here to the extent that the Court's analysis
condemns Suriname for the conditions it created. While the Court
does not mention the original act in its reasoning, the
representatives' analysis articulates the premise for the violation as
the act itself. It is difficult to separate the Court's reasoning from
the act itself, while still maintaining logical continuity. To speak of
a violation by Suriname for not creating conditions for the return
of villagers, without referring to the original reason for their
departure, leaves a large gap in the reasoning process.
79. Id. (quoting Representative of the Secretary General, Report of the Representative
of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission
resolution 1997/39, delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998).
80. Moiwana Village, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, at 52-55.
81. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 49, art. 21.
82. Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
at 52 (June 15, 2005).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 53-55.
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The fourth and final alleged violation is of Articles 8 and 25 ofS 85
the Convention. Article 8 covers a criminal defendant's right to a• 86
fair trial . Article 25(1) protects every person's "right to simple
and prompt recourse . . . to a competent court or tribunal for
protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights.
87
Article 25(2) requires states to help provide that remedy. 8 The
Commission and representatives focused their analysis on the lack89
of legal recourse available to the villagers. Suriname's analysis
identified that, if anything, the alleged violation is a continuing
violation. Suriname then argued it provided legal recourse
consistent with the Convention.
In analyzing the claim, the Court articulated its ability to92
examine Suriname's obligations to investigate the massacre. First,
Suriname had an "ex officio duty to initiate, without delay, a
serious, impartial, and effective investigation. "9 Second, Suriname
did not investigate the massacre with due diligence.94 Finally, the
judicial delay was too extensive to be justified.95 Based on these
findings, the Court held that Suriname violated its duty to create. ... . . 96
conditions necessary for the villagers to receive justice.
The Court's reasoning is consistent, but flawed. First, there is
no support to the argument that a denial of justice is a continuing
violation that enables the Court to pass judgment on the original
wrongful act. Second, the Court's analysis of whether Suriname is
fulfilling its obligations to promote justice, even as a violation
subsequent to Suriname becoming a State Party, involves an
inherent condemnation of the State. While the Court argues it is
only analyzing the subsequent investigations, it cannot separate
that analysis from its perception of what would be a just outcome.
The Court used an outcome determinative test, not a
procedural test. The Court wanted Suriname to investigate but
85. Id. at 55-65.
86. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 49, at 4.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
at 55-57 (June 15, 2005).
90. Id. at 57.
91. Id. at 57-59.
92. Id. at 59.
93. Id. at 60.
94. Id. at 61-64.
95. Id. at 64-65.
96. Id. at 65.
163
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also required prosecution of the responsible parties.97 This
requirement assumes that a finding of responsibility is possible.
Numerous crimes go unpunished in many countries despite good-
faith efforts by the government. Here, the Court showed its
inherent belief that Suriname is responsible. Absent that belief,
the Court could not conclude that punishment must occur, since it
is possible that the responsible parties could not be found.
B. The Court Awarded Reparations that are Unrelated to
Continuing Violations or Subsequent Violations, Thereby Violating
the Limitation of Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis
The Court ordered numerous reparations that are outside its
jurisdictional power to award. The Court is authorized to award
reparations by Article 63(1) of the American Convention." Article
63(1) allows the Court to take appropriate measures to guarantee
victims the ability to enjoy their rights, as well as to order
compensation for past violations of those rights.99 The first aspect
involves remedies for the effects of the violation'0° and was
discussed in Part IV(A) above. The second aspect involves
compensation for material damages, moral damages, and other
costs.101 In this case, the Court ordered material damages, moral
damages, several other types of reparations, and costs.
First, the Court ordered Suriname to pay material damages
for the repair of villagers' homes.103 The Court based its decision
on the violence that led the villagers to leave their lands.' 4 The
original act of violence damaged the homes prior to Suriname
becoming a State Party. Suriname was probably correct in arguing
that the Commission sought damages for the act itself "in a
roundabout way."'10 5
Second the Court ordered Suriname to pay moral damages to
each victim. The Court cited the failure to obtain justice, lack of
97. Id.
98. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 49, at 18.
99. Id.
100. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 27, at 242-54.
101. Id. at 254-80.
102. Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
at 71-84 (June 15, 2005).
103. Id. at 72-73.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 72.
106. Id. at 76.
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knowledge about victims' remains, and the villagers' expulsion
from the land as the basis for the damages. 10 7 The arguments made
previously again apply to this section. The logical root of all the
violations is the act itself.
Finally, the Court ordered Suriname to pay reparations for
victim satisfaction and to guarantee non-repetition in the future. '08
The Court obligated Suriname to pay reparations under this
category for different reasons, some of which are problematic. One
problematic order is for the creation of a developmental fund to
aid health, housing, and education.09 The Court cites the Act itself
as the source of the obligation.11° Even though the goal is a
legitimate humanitarian goal, it is a direct monetary award for
Suriname's actions prior to being a State Party. Additionally, the
Court ordered Suriname to apologize publicly and to build a
monument, aiming to prevent similar actions by the State in the
future."1 While Suriname had initially volunteered to take-these
steps," 2 the Court's order implicitly condemns and punishes the
State for its role in the attacks. Again, these orders overstep the
temporal jurisdiction of the Court.
V. CONCLUSION
There is nothing morally wrong with the Court's decision. In
fact, it is morally justified, and as such, is a legitimate piece of
international law under the theories that find legitimacy in
morality. However, the legal fiction cannot be denied. Courts do
not need to utterly refrain from these fictions, as the ends here
seem to justify the means. However, courts should be concerned
with how these fictions affect the advancement of human rights
law.
States may refrain from joining new human rights treaties for
fear of retroactive application. This deterrent effect can retard the
growth of new international norms. The line between a morally
legitimate judicial outcome and a decision that will pragmatically
advance human rights is hazy. Courts should be attuned to
107. Id. at 75-76.
108. Id. at 80-83.
109. Id. at 82.
110. Id. at 84.
111. Id. at 83.
112. Id.
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thinking about the pragmatic effects of their decisions when trying
to overcome jurisdictional limitations ratione temporis.
The purpose of human rights treaties is the advancement of
those rights. However, zealous application of those norms to
Member States for actions prior to their membership oversteps the
jurisdiction of those courts. While courts are morally justified in so
acting, they create a disincentive for new states to join those
treaties. If the object of human rights treaties is to embody and
codify new customary law, deterring membership undermines this
objective. Therefore, while courts may be justified in principle to
create legal fictions and apply human rights law to states for events
prior to their membership, the effect of such application may run
counter to the object of the treaties.
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